<p>Scholars have recently debated whether deep brain stimulation (DBS) threatens personal identity. Françoise Baylis advances a relational identity-constitution framework, asserting that the purported threat of DBS to personal identity becomes problematic when identity is viewed through dynamic, narrative, and relational lenses. This paper offers a more nuanced perspective. While we acknowledge the significance of Baylis’s relational identity-constituting framework, we contend that her conclusion warrants further examination. Our analysis reveals that DBS can indeed pose significant challenges to personal identity, specifically by compromising the narrative subject’s capacity to construct their relational identity. From the perspective of the relational identity-constituting approach, we demonstrate that the fundamental issue lies in the disruption of the equilibrium between self-perception and social recognition. Specifically, DBS can disrupt the balance between self-ascription and ascription by others. To address potential identity disruptions caused by DBS, we proposed that identity restoration should focus on two key aspects: enhancing patients’ capacity to construct and internalize coherent life narratives, and strengthening their capacity to engage in meaningful dialogue with others to foster mutual understanding and recognition.</p>