<p>Brain-computer interface research is an interdisciplinary field aiming to establish direct communication between the brain and external devices and holds great promise for assistive technology and healthcare. Ethical issues have been covered for years alongside BCI research, yet novel ethical issues are forthcoming. This paper critically examines a recent proposal advocating for the use of Ulysses contracts within BCI research, drawing parallels with its proposed application in xenotransplantation. While Ulysses contracts in psychiatry serve as advance directives, being enacted when a patient loses decision-making capacity, their proposed application in BCI research—specifically concerning the explantation of devices—fundamentally misconstrues their purpose. We argue that the telos of genuine Ulysses contracts is incongruent with their proposed reappropriation in the BCI context. Furthermore, enforcing such contracts on individuals with retained decision-making capacity is ethically problematic and legally untested, representing a violation of bodily autonomy. Unlike the public health rationale sometimes invoked in xenotransplantation, no comparable justification exists for BCIs. Ultimately, the issues surrounding device explantation in BCI research are rooted in property and contract law, not in the management of diminished autonomy that Ulysses contracts are designed to address.</p>

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Neuro-Nonsense: Why Ulysses Contracts don't Compute in Brain-Computer Interface Research

  • Daniel J. Hurst,
  • Christopher A. Bobier

摘要

Brain-computer interface research is an interdisciplinary field aiming to establish direct communication between the brain and external devices and holds great promise for assistive technology and healthcare. Ethical issues have been covered for years alongside BCI research, yet novel ethical issues are forthcoming. This paper critically examines a recent proposal advocating for the use of Ulysses contracts within BCI research, drawing parallels with its proposed application in xenotransplantation. While Ulysses contracts in psychiatry serve as advance directives, being enacted when a patient loses decision-making capacity, their proposed application in BCI research—specifically concerning the explantation of devices—fundamentally misconstrues their purpose. We argue that the telos of genuine Ulysses contracts is incongruent with their proposed reappropriation in the BCI context. Furthermore, enforcing such contracts on individuals with retained decision-making capacity is ethically problematic and legally untested, representing a violation of bodily autonomy. Unlike the public health rationale sometimes invoked in xenotransplantation, no comparable justification exists for BCIs. Ultimately, the issues surrounding device explantation in BCI research are rooted in property and contract law, not in the management of diminished autonomy that Ulysses contracts are designed to address.