<p>This paper examines the conditions under which Chinese infrastructure finance in South Asia generates fiscal dependence or political leverage under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Drawing on a project-level dataset of 221 infrastructure project groups across five countries (2013–2023), it develops a comparative analytical framework that operationalises visibility, dependence, and operational control as three observable mechanisms of influence. The study details the contractual practices rooted in BRI financing arrangements (including safeguards, pledges, and aspects of operational control) in South Asia to reveal how infrastructure creates important structural conditions for influence but not a predetermined “debt-trap”. Chinese infrastructure finance in South Asia concentrates in capital-intensive sectors rather than dispersed small-scale development activities. Any resultant influence perceived as “coercive” is usually conditional on the agency of the hosts. The findings suggest that infrastructure scale alone does not produce political leverage. Instead, the paper challenges the borrower-vulnerability narrative by showing that Chinese infrastructure exposure in South Asia operates mainly through fiscal commitment and repayment safeguards rather than widespread transfer of managerial authority.</p>