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<p>William Ramsey’s recent account of eliminative materialism (EM) treats EM as an ontological thesis about what mental kinds do not exist. I argue, by contrast, that the core of EM in Quine, Feyerabend, Rorty, and Stich is methodological: it concerns how to revise, replace, or retire psychological posits under scientific pressure, with any ontological eliminations derivative of method. A close reading of the founding texts shows that inventory‑style realism and a fixed priority of metaphysics over method misclassify EM’s commitments. Restoring a method‑first order clarifies confusions that have shaped the debate and aligns “scientific eliminativism” with the founders’ method‑first orientation. The result is a historically grounded reorientation: EM primarily counsels conceptual re‑engineering in light of successful science, rather than a priori ontological austerity.</p>

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Method Before Ontology: Reconstructing the Core of Eliminative Materialism

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年1月26日

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  • Serdal Tümkaya

摘要

William Ramsey’s recent account of eliminative materialism (EM) treats EM as an ontological thesis about what mental kinds do not exist. I argue, by contrast, that the core of EM in Quine, Feyerabend, Rorty, and Stich is methodological: it concerns how to revise, replace, or retire psychological posits under scientific pressure, with any ontological eliminations derivative of method. A close reading of the founding texts shows that inventory‑style realism and a fixed priority of metaphysics over method misclassify EM’s commitments. Restoring a method‑first order clarifies confusions that have shaped the debate and aligns “scientific eliminativism” with the founders’ method‑first orientation. The result is a historically grounded reorientation: EM primarily counsels conceptual re‑engineering in light of successful science, rather than a priori ontological austerity.