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<p>Ichikawa (2011) proposes a sensitivity account of knowledge adapted in a contextualist framework. On the one hand, this seems to be an attractive response to skepticism as it gives skeptics their due while preserving ordinary knowledge (at least in some contexts). On the other hand, it does not imply closure failure for knowledge. In this paper, it is argued that the account could not respond to skepticism successfully while retaining epistemic closure. If the possible worlds that should be considered in a non-skeptical context always include the closest possible world where the target proposition is false, then the account implies epistemic closure; if not, then the account makes it too easy to know the negation of a skeptical hypothesis.</p>

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Contextualism, Sensitivity, and Skepticism

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年2月2日

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  • Bin Zhao

摘要

Ichikawa (2011) proposes a sensitivity account of knowledge adapted in a contextualist framework. On the one hand, this seems to be an attractive response to skepticism as it gives skeptics their due while preserving ordinary knowledge (at least in some contexts). On the other hand, it does not imply closure failure for knowledge. In this paper, it is argued that the account could not respond to skepticism successfully while retaining epistemic closure. If the possible worlds that should be considered in a non-skeptical context always include the closest possible world where the target proposition is false, then the account implies epistemic closure; if not, then the account makes it too easy to know the negation of a skeptical hypothesis.