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<p>David Miguel Gray’s “Doxastic and Epistemic Sources of Offense for Slurring Terms,” published in this journal in 2025, proposes and defends a novel account of slurs. Here, I give an additional reason in favor of his account: it coheres well with recent philosophical theories of insults. This kind of fortuitous external consistency is a significant theoretical virtue. In this brief response paper, I will summarize Gray’s account of slurs and explain its natural fit with recent philosophical work on insults. After that central task is done, I will make two further observations: in section <InternalRef RefID="Sec4">3</InternalRef>, about the relationship between epistemic and linguistic sources of offense, and in section <InternalRef RefID="Sec5">4</InternalRef>, about a possibility for future research raised by Gray’s taxonomy of negatively valenced terms.</p>

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Slurs and Insults: a Reply to David Miguel Gray’s “Doxastic and Epistemic Sources of Offense for Slurring Terms”

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年12月23日

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  • Helen L. Daly

摘要

David Miguel Gray’s “Doxastic and Epistemic Sources of Offense for Slurring Terms,” published in this journal in 2025, proposes and defends a novel account of slurs. Here, I give an additional reason in favor of his account: it coheres well with recent philosophical theories of insults. This kind of fortuitous external consistency is a significant theoretical virtue. In this brief response paper, I will summarize Gray’s account of slurs and explain its natural fit with recent philosophical work on insults. After that central task is done, I will make two further observations: in section 3, about the relationship between epistemic and linguistic sources of offense, and in section 4, about a possibility for future research raised by Gray’s taxonomy of negatively valenced terms.