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<p>In this paper, I present a crude, provisional theory of moral condemnation based on a discursive analysis of an interaction between two prominent political figures – on the social media platform X (formerly known as Twitter) – in the aftermath of the Iranian missile strike on Israel on 1 October 2024. Based on the analysis, I argue that moral condemnations may serve as a tool for regulating action, and I provide a game-based analogy which may help encapsule two central aspects of moral condemnation: the construction of moral responsibility and a relationship of guilt <i>(setting the board)</i>; and the (attempt to) regulate action <i>(playing the game)</i>. Finally, I propose that we may also use moral condemnations as a substitute for action – especially in instances where the actor is either unable or unwilling to intervene. By morally condemning we may create a socially and/or personally legitimate excuse for inaction through a displacement of the responsibility to act – thus, ultimately allowing oneself to not do anything by not doing nothing.</p>

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‘I Condemn!’: A Discursive Analysis of Moral Condemnations in the Political Realm

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  • 发表日期：

    2025年3月31日

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  • Jonas Tellefsen Hejlesen

摘要

In this paper, I present a crude, provisional theory of moral condemnation based on a discursive analysis of an interaction between two prominent political figures – on the social media platform X (formerly known as Twitter) – in the aftermath of the Iranian missile strike on Israel on 1 October 2024. Based on the analysis, I argue that moral condemnations may serve as a tool for regulating action, and I provide a game-based analogy which may help encapsule two central aspects of moral condemnation: the construction of moral responsibility and a relationship of guilt (setting the board); and the (attempt to) regulate action (playing the game). Finally, I propose that we may also use moral condemnations as a substitute for action – especially in instances where the actor is either unable or unwilling to intervene. By morally condemning we may create a socially and/or personally legitimate excuse for inaction through a displacement of the responsibility to act – thus, ultimately allowing oneself to not do anything by not doing nothing.