<p>How do voters respond to trade shocks? And can legislators influence voter responses through their standpoints on free trade? In this paper, I address these questions using the emergence of China as a major global exporter as a quasi-experiment that created substantial geographic variation in the U.S. regarding exposure to international trade and its consequences for local labor markets. I find that voters are less likely to reelect representatives if they suffered from trade shocks, but are also highly responsive to politicians’ political positions and their responsibility, up to the point where representatives may benefit from their electorate being among the losers from trade. Further, while members of Congress were not punished by the electorate on aggregate, incumbent presidents incurred heavy losses in trade-exposed regions, consistent with voters being aware of their more direct influence on trade policy and the economy. Lastly, I find that trade did not only affect political polarization recently, but that especially increased offshoring already contributed to polarization well before the 2000s.</p>