<p>Autocrats frequently employ co-optation to neutralize labor threats; yet, little is known about why this strategy succeeds in some cases and fails in others. I argue that the effectiveness of co-optation depends on its scope — whether it narrowly targets union elites or broadly incorporates union leaders and members. Using qualitative evidence and archival data from Tunisia and Morocco, I show how different co-optation strategies shaped unions’ internal organization, equipping them with distinct capacities for resistance during the Arab Spring. In Morocco, broad co-optation integrated labor into the state, weakening grassroots mobilization and bolstering regime control. By contrast, in Tunisia, selective co-optation of union elites inadvertently strengthened unions’ organizational capacity by fostering vertical accountability and facilitating labor opposition against authoritarian rule. This study advances research on co-optation by demonstrating how organizational responses to elite maneuvers can unintentionally empower labor movements. It challenges the common perception that elite co-optation weakens labor opposition, and instead highlights the dynamic and contested nature of authoritarian control.</p>