<p>The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) adopted the Abuja Declaration on Political Principles in 1991 and the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance in 2001, aimed, among others, at deterring unconstitutional change of government, particularly via military coup, in West Africa. In light of the backlash that stemmed from ECOWAS’s attempt to sanction the coups d’état in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, this paper assesses the enforceability of ECOWAS’s non-tolerant principle against unconstitutional change of government in West Africa. The paper seeks to answer the following questions: What is an unconstitutional change of government in the context of ECOWAS’s protocol on democracy and good governance? How does ECOWAS respond to other forms of regime unconstitutionality apart from coups d’état? How have the challenges of effectively sanctioning unconstitutional changes of government impacted the continued cohesion and relevance of ECOWAS? The paper posits that although ECOWAS’s unconstitutional change of government principle is not bad in itself, its legitimacy and justification have been contradicted by the fact that it has been indifferent to other forms of non-military unconstitutional regime changes and perhaps tenure elongation, sit-tight, and succession crises, smacking thereby of double standards. Rethinking ECOWAS’s protocol on democracy and good governance to emphasize other forms of unconstitutional changes that occur in the context of electoral and transitional politics in the region is, therefore, pertinent.</p>

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The Resurgence of Military Coups in West Africa: Interrogating ECOWAS’s Stance on Unconstitutional Change of Government

  • Al Chukwuma Okoli,
  • Saheed Babajide Owonikoko,
  • Joachim Chukwuma Okafor

摘要

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) adopted the Abuja Declaration on Political Principles in 1991 and the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance in 2001, aimed, among others, at deterring unconstitutional change of government, particularly via military coup, in West Africa. In light of the backlash that stemmed from ECOWAS’s attempt to sanction the coups d’état in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, this paper assesses the enforceability of ECOWAS’s non-tolerant principle against unconstitutional change of government in West Africa. The paper seeks to answer the following questions: What is an unconstitutional change of government in the context of ECOWAS’s protocol on democracy and good governance? How does ECOWAS respond to other forms of regime unconstitutionality apart from coups d’état? How have the challenges of effectively sanctioning unconstitutional changes of government impacted the continued cohesion and relevance of ECOWAS? The paper posits that although ECOWAS’s unconstitutional change of government principle is not bad in itself, its legitimacy and justification have been contradicted by the fact that it has been indifferent to other forms of non-military unconstitutional regime changes and perhaps tenure elongation, sit-tight, and succession crises, smacking thereby of double standards. Rethinking ECOWAS’s protocol on democracy and good governance to emphasize other forms of unconstitutional changes that occur in the context of electoral and transitional politics in the region is, therefore, pertinent.