<p>Existing studies have identified five major sources of illegal political financing: namely, funding from questionable sources, corporate bodies, foreign donations, government contractors, and anonymous sources. However, the clientelist manipulation of certain social protection programmes for electoral gains has received scant attention in existing academic conversations on political financing. Hence, this study shows how some social investment programmes in Nigeria, such as the Subsidy Reinvestment and Empowerment Programme, N-Power, TraderMoni, and Micro Enterprise Enhancement Scheme, were exploited by incumbent politicians and their political parties for election campaign financing. The study interrogates how these social protection interventions were manipulated to fertilise the ground for vote solicitation in the build-up to elections in Nigeria. The study relies on documentary evidence, including official documents and media reports. Analysing the data through the theoretical lens of clientelism, the study concludes that politicians and their political patrons frequently exploit social protection interventions to advance their (re)election bids and sustain their patronage networks.</p>

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Political Financing and Vulnerability: Social Protection and Election Campaign Financing in Nigeria

  • Chikodiri Nwangwu

摘要

Existing studies have identified five major sources of illegal political financing: namely, funding from questionable sources, corporate bodies, foreign donations, government contractors, and anonymous sources. However, the clientelist manipulation of certain social protection programmes for electoral gains has received scant attention in existing academic conversations on political financing. Hence, this study shows how some social investment programmes in Nigeria, such as the Subsidy Reinvestment and Empowerment Programme, N-Power, TraderMoni, and Micro Enterprise Enhancement Scheme, were exploited by incumbent politicians and their political parties for election campaign financing. The study interrogates how these social protection interventions were manipulated to fertilise the ground for vote solicitation in the build-up to elections in Nigeria. The study relies on documentary evidence, including official documents and media reports. Analysing the data through the theoretical lens of clientelism, the study concludes that politicians and their political patrons frequently exploit social protection interventions to advance their (re)election bids and sustain their patronage networks.