Weaponizing Juries in a Democracy
摘要
An enduring theory of the jury is that the institution is a tool the people can use against elites. The jury can be a sword, to give elites their just desserts. Or it can be a shield, to protect defendants against elite judges and prosecutors. Another possibility is that elites can use the jury to attack each other. As certain trials in ancient Athens and the trial of Donald Trump suggest, the jury can be weaponized in inter-elite warfare. Juries are especially useful in such battles, as they can help to cloak the power of judges, prosecutors, and other elites in instigating and driving the case. Montesquieu pointed to the ability of juries to cloak the power of elite judges, although he hoped judges would use their power to promote liberty. The legal system in the United States is particularly suited for the weaponization of juries; that of England and Wales, less so. An even better system may be the mixed panel of professional judges and lay jurors sitting together, in effect a microcosm of the Aristotelian mixed regime.