<p>The Payment Channel Network (PCN) is the Lightning Network cornerstone infrastructure that enhances blockchain scalability by enabling unlimited volumes, low-cost, off-chain payment transactions processing through interconnected payment channels. Meanwhile, larger payment amounts are divided into small payment splits. Despite its vital architecture in reducing transaction fees and latency, the reliable delivery of these splits is not guaranteed due to potential path users’ adversarial behaviour. To mitigate this risk, conditional transfers based cryptographic commitment schemes, such as Hash Time-Locked Contracts (HTLC) is introduced. However, HTLC introduce privacy vulnerabilities by exposing transaction metadata. Recent state of the art solutions has aimed to improve privacy and security, but often encounter trade-offs involving protocol efficiency and Lightning Network compatibility. In addition, current dispute resolution mechanisms remain under the blockchain, expensive operations falling fundamentally under rigid time constraints, which may prove ineffective in adversarial scenarios. This paper examines the current landscape of cryptographic commitment schemes for multi-hop payment protocols, identifying key limitations related to privacy, efficiency, compatibility, and dispute resolution. To address these challenges, we propose two conceptual contributions: (1) Dynamic Chameleon Hash Time-Locked Contracts (D-CHTLC), a commitment scheme that preserves Lightning Network compatibility while enhancing privacy and efficiency; and (2) a local dispute resolution mechanism that minimizes reliance on on-chain arbitration. By mapping unresolved challenges and evaluating theoretical solutions, this work lays a foundation for developing practical, secure, and scalable payment protocols within the Lightning Network, providing direction for future research.</p>