In their systematic review, Semple et al. (2025) conclude that conducted energy weapons (CEWs) are “generally a safe intervention option,” citing minimal injuries and rare fatalities. While methodologically sound, this conclusion rests on a narrowly defined evidence-base and overlooks critical dimensions of risk. In this commentary, we argue that such a verdict is constrained by what systems theory refers to as first-order observation: a focus on surface-level outcomes without reflection on how “safety” itself is constructed or selectively defined. We introduce three empirically documented unintended consequences of CEW use, escalation through availability (“Law of the Instrument”), increased aggression from weapon presence (“Less-Than-Lethal Effect”), and the operational failure leading to lethal force (“End-of-the-Road Problem”), that challenge the review’s optimistic framing. We then show how these risks remain underexamined due to systemic biases in CEW research, including sample and data source bias, conflict of interest, and a dominance of quantitative methodologies. By engaging in second-order observation, we expose the epistemological constraints shaping CEW research and call attention to the performative nature of declaring a technology “safe.” We advocate for a conceptual shift from “safety” to “risk” and an overall shift in research paradigm: one that incorporates qualitative methods, centers affected communities, and acknowledges risk as a contested and context-dependent construct, rather than a fixed empirical finding.
