Scholarlink

<p>This study explores whether prosocietal individuals can use influence tactics to gain power and reduce socially harmful practices in organizations, despite resistance from peers prioritizing short-term gains. By theoretically driven integration of championing, CSR/ESG, and organizational politics literature, we introduce <i>Benevolent Machiavellianism</i>, i.e., prosocietal organizational politics. In a behavioral task with four-person groups (<i>N</i> = 466), participants repeatedly withdrew funds from a charity pool before competing for votes on decision-making authority. Widespread antisocial behavior persisted, as prosocietal players failed to curb it. Those who deviated from group norms received fewer votes, showing the importance of group alignment over traditional influence tactics. While political skill boosted confidence in persuasion, it had little impact on actual outcomes. Meanwhile, malevolent Machiavellianism and power motives predicted greater charity withdrawals in the final stage. By treating the rarity of <i>Benevolent Machiavellians</i> (estimated to consist around 1.5% of the sample) as the focal issue, we theorize structural powerlessness as a norm- and incentive-based barrier to prosocietal insider change.</p>

错误：搜索内容不能为空，请输入英文关键词
错误：关键词超出字数限制，请精简
高级检索

Prosocietal but powerless: the struggle to persuade and lead for ethical goals

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年6月1日

查看全文
  • Petr Houdek,
  • Štěpán Bahník

摘要

This study explores whether prosocietal individuals can use influence tactics to gain power and reduce socially harmful practices in organizations, despite resistance from peers prioritizing short-term gains. By theoretically driven integration of championing, CSR/ESG, and organizational politics literature, we introduce Benevolent Machiavellianism, i.e., prosocietal organizational politics. In a behavioral task with four-person groups (N = 466), participants repeatedly withdrew funds from a charity pool before competing for votes on decision-making authority. Widespread antisocial behavior persisted, as prosocietal players failed to curb it. Those who deviated from group norms received fewer votes, showing the importance of group alignment over traditional influence tactics. While political skill boosted confidence in persuasion, it had little impact on actual outcomes. Meanwhile, malevolent Machiavellianism and power motives predicted greater charity withdrawals in the final stage. By treating the rarity of Benevolent Machiavellians (estimated to consist around 1.5% of the sample) as the focal issue, we theorize structural powerlessness as a norm- and incentive-based barrier to prosocietal insider change.