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<p>This study examines whether board-level CSR committees influence corporate dividend policy and whether this relationship operates through CSR disclosure. Drawing on agency, stakeholder, and signaling theories, we argue that CSR committees function as governance mechanisms that enhance transparency and managerial oversight, thereby shaping corporate payout decisions. Using a global unbalanced panel of 30,982 firm-year observations from 73 countries over the period 2002–2023, we employ firm fixed-effects regressions and two-stage least squares to address potential endogeneity concerns. The results show that firms with CSR committees distribute significantly higher dividends, and this relationship is mediated by CSR disclosure, measured by the issuance of standalone CSR reports. Additional analyses indicate that the governance–disclosure–dividend relationship is stronger in developing economies and in countries with weaker investor protection, suggesting that CSR committees may substitute for weaker external governance institutions. These findings highlight the financial implications of sustainability governance and demonstrate how CSR committees and disclosure practices jointly influence corporate payout policies in global capital markets.</p>

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Do CSR committees influence dividend policy? Evidence on the mediation effect of CSR disclosure

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年4月27日

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  • Le Thanh Hoa,
  • Phan Khanh Ly,
  • Le Thi Thanh Binh

摘要

This study examines whether board-level CSR committees influence corporate dividend policy and whether this relationship operates through CSR disclosure. Drawing on agency, stakeholder, and signaling theories, we argue that CSR committees function as governance mechanisms that enhance transparency and managerial oversight, thereby shaping corporate payout decisions. Using a global unbalanced panel of 30,982 firm-year observations from 73 countries over the period 2002–2023, we employ firm fixed-effects regressions and two-stage least squares to address potential endogeneity concerns. The results show that firms with CSR committees distribute significantly higher dividends, and this relationship is mediated by CSR disclosure, measured by the issuance of standalone CSR reports. Additional analyses indicate that the governance–disclosure–dividend relationship is stronger in developing economies and in countries with weaker investor protection, suggesting that CSR committees may substitute for weaker external governance institutions. These findings highlight the financial implications of sustainability governance and demonstrate how CSR committees and disclosure practices jointly influence corporate payout policies in global capital markets.