<p>The Village Forest (Hutan Desa, HD) scheme in Indonesia aims to balance ecological conservation with community empowerment. However, this study reveals significant institutional dissonance between formal regulatory frameworks and local socio-ecological realities in two villages in South Sumatra. Using a qualitative case-study approach, we found that about 95% of HD-designated land is managed individually for rubber and oil palm cultivation, conflicting with the collective management mandate. Patronage systems controlled by local traders govern 85–90% of production, while the Village Forest Management Institution (LPHD) mainly functions as an administrative entity. Illegal conversion to oil palm plantations has further degraded forest cover. Our findings suggest that policy shortcomings stem from the failure to incorporate historical land-use legacies and local economic networks into formal governance. Communities maintain individual management as a rational livelihood strategy shaped by socio-economic realities. In response, we propose a hybrid governance model that integrates individual tenure within collective frameworks through adaptive regulations and ecosystem-based incentives. This approach underscores the need for context-sensitive environmental policies recognizing institutional pluralism and historical path dependencies. Our study contributes to understanding complex socio-political dimensions of community forest management, providing actionable insights for policymakers and practitioners working to reconcile conservation and livelihood goals in Indonesia and comparable Global South contexts.</p>

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Institutional Dissonance and Livelihood Adaptations in Indonesia’s Village Forest Program: Towards a Hybrid Governance for Legitimacy

  • Edwin Martin,
  • Bambang Tejo Premono,
  • Surati Surati,
  • Sylviani Sylviani,
  • Sulistya Ekawati

摘要

The Village Forest (Hutan Desa, HD) scheme in Indonesia aims to balance ecological conservation with community empowerment. However, this study reveals significant institutional dissonance between formal regulatory frameworks and local socio-ecological realities in two villages in South Sumatra. Using a qualitative case-study approach, we found that about 95% of HD-designated land is managed individually for rubber and oil palm cultivation, conflicting with the collective management mandate. Patronage systems controlled by local traders govern 85–90% of production, while the Village Forest Management Institution (LPHD) mainly functions as an administrative entity. Illegal conversion to oil palm plantations has further degraded forest cover. Our findings suggest that policy shortcomings stem from the failure to incorporate historical land-use legacies and local economic networks into formal governance. Communities maintain individual management as a rational livelihood strategy shaped by socio-economic realities. In response, we propose a hybrid governance model that integrates individual tenure within collective frameworks through adaptive regulations and ecosystem-based incentives. This approach underscores the need for context-sensitive environmental policies recognizing institutional pluralism and historical path dependencies. Our study contributes to understanding complex socio-political dimensions of community forest management, providing actionable insights for policymakers and practitioners working to reconcile conservation and livelihood goals in Indonesia and comparable Global South contexts.