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<p>A number of contemporary scholars find certain similarities between both Indian and Greek philosophical traditions with regard to inferential reasoning by arguing that these two systems might have influenced each other. Such a persisting belief generates a debate further that whether the structure of <i>Nyāya</i> syllogism is influenced by Aristotelian structure or the <i>vice versa</i>. The purpose of this paper is to examine the mentioned debate. This paper attempts to present that the mentioned controversy is grounded on the false belief that <i>Nyāya</i> and Aristotelian possess the similar pattern of syllogism. To establish the same, the paper addresses two prime arguments. One: <i>Nyāya</i> syllogism and Aristotelian syllogism cannot be translatable into one another. Second: There are fundamental differences between <i>Nyāya</i> syllogism and Aristotelian syllogism. Two major differences are highlighted in this paper. The first difference is about the distinct nature of ‘Inference’ and ‘Argument’; and the second difference is about the different application of the meaning of the Terms. Furthermore, the paper aims to provide a new reading of this presumed confusion that these two models of syllogisms are structurally different. Thereby these two systems allegedly having borrowed insights from one another is untenable.</p>

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Of Syllogism: Revisiting the Conflict between Nyāya and Aristotle

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年3月28日

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  • Swarup Pal,
  • Ashoka Kumar Tarai

摘要

A number of contemporary scholars find certain similarities between both Indian and Greek philosophical traditions with regard to inferential reasoning by arguing that these two systems might have influenced each other. Such a persisting belief generates a debate further that whether the structure of Nyāya syllogism is influenced by Aristotelian structure or the vice versa. The purpose of this paper is to examine the mentioned debate. This paper attempts to present that the mentioned controversy is grounded on the false belief that Nyāya and Aristotelian possess the similar pattern of syllogism. To establish the same, the paper addresses two prime arguments. One: Nyāya syllogism and Aristotelian syllogism cannot be translatable into one another. Second: There are fundamental differences between Nyāya syllogism and Aristotelian syllogism. Two major differences are highlighted in this paper. The first difference is about the distinct nature of ‘Inference’ and ‘Argument’; and the second difference is about the different application of the meaning of the Terms. Furthermore, the paper aims to provide a new reading of this presumed confusion that these two models of syllogisms are structurally different. Thereby these two systems allegedly having borrowed insights from one another is untenable.