<p>This article situates Sengzhao’s 僧肇 claim that “each thing abides in a single moment by its nature” within a comparative framework that juxtaposes the Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma and Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka. The enquiry shows, first, that although Sengzhao and the Sarvāstivāda school alike acknowledge the momentary dharma as a discrete existence, they diverge sharply over continuity: the Sarvāstivāda school constructs a quasi-continuum by grouping momentary dharmas into successions of “common characteristics” based on homogeneity, whereas Sengzhao denies that any such sequence is real. Second, Sengzhao’s <i>Treatise on the Immutability of Things</i> (<i>Wu Buqian Lun</i> 物不遷論) cannot simply be assimilated to Nāgārjuna’s method. Nāgārjuna uses the principle of the unchanging confinement of things to derive the self-contradictions of his opponents, which is fundamentally a <i>reductio ad absurdum</i>. Meanwhile, Sengzhao perceives the “own being” (<i>svabhāva</i>) as the “target” established by the <i>Mūlamadhyamakakārikā</i> for negating “own being” as the existence of the world. Consequently, his position diverges not only from the Sarvāstivādin account of momentary continuity but also from Nāgārjuna’s strictly apophatic strategy.</p>