<p>Throughout history, theistic thinkers such as Anselm (<CitationRef CitationID="CR1">1080/1998</CitationRef>), Aquinas (<CitationRef CitationID="CR2">1485/1947</CitationRef>), Descartes (<CitationRef CitationID="CR15">1641/2003</CitationRef>), and Plantinga (<CitationRef CitationID="CR55">1993</CitationRef>) have argued that our cognitive faculties are innately veridical as a divine creation. However, contemporary findings from cognitive science have exposed our vulnerability to numerous cognitive biases, which many recent authors consider as evidence against divine creation (Fales, <CitationRef CitationID="CR16">1996</CitationRef>; Ramsey, <CitationRef CitationID="CR59">2002</CitationRef>; Childers, <CitationRef CitationID="CR10">2011</CitationRef>; Teehan, <CitationRef CitationID="CR76">2016</CitationRef>; Park, <CitationRef CitationID="CR51">2018</CitationRef>; Lucas, <CitationRef CitationID="CR39">2018</CitationRef>; Launonen, <CitationRef CitationID="CR37">2021</CitationRef>; Kvandal, <CitationRef CitationID="CR36">2022</CitationRef>; contra Loke, <CitationRef CitationID="CR38">2022</CitationRef>). We draw on a point of convergence between the theistic perspective and the naturalistic evolutionary perspective, namely, that we are finite, corporeal beings, and argue that there are good empirical reasons to view our cognitive biases as grounded in reasonable designs within such finitude. The upshot is that the problem lacks a solid empirical foundation. This paper can simultaneously be considered a scientifically grounded exploration on human cognitive finitudes within a theistic context.</p>

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Theism, Corporeal Finitudes, and the Science of Human Biases

  • Lok-Chi Chan,
  • Ryoji Sato,
  • Andrew J. Latham

摘要

Throughout history, theistic thinkers such as Anselm (1080/1998), Aquinas (1485/1947), Descartes (1641/2003), and Plantinga (1993) have argued that our cognitive faculties are innately veridical as a divine creation. However, contemporary findings from cognitive science have exposed our vulnerability to numerous cognitive biases, which many recent authors consider as evidence against divine creation (Fales, 1996; Ramsey, 2002; Childers, 2011; Teehan, 2016; Park, 2018; Lucas, 2018; Launonen, 2021; Kvandal, 2022; contra Loke, 2022). We draw on a point of convergence between the theistic perspective and the naturalistic evolutionary perspective, namely, that we are finite, corporeal beings, and argue that there are good empirical reasons to view our cognitive biases as grounded in reasonable designs within such finitude. The upshot is that the problem lacks a solid empirical foundation. This paper can simultaneously be considered a scientifically grounded exploration on human cognitive finitudes within a theistic context.