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<p>Deontic logic aims to formulate moral concepts consisting of obligation, permission, and prohibition. Although the standard system of deontic logic (SDL) has long provided a fundamental framework for this kind of formalization, its application to non-ideal normative contexts continues to provide challenges. This paper provides a conceptual examination of SDL by analyzing its fundamental principles, semantic assumptions, and well-known paradoxes. The analysis emphasizes how moral conflicts and contrary-to-duty imperatives reveal structural tensions within conventional deontic frameworks, with a focus on classic paradoxes like the Chisholm and Ross paradoxes. The paper seeks to explain these challenges and demonstrate how they represent deeper conceptual constraints in modeling normative reasoning using idealized modal logics, rather than suggesting a new logical system. The main contribution of the paper is therefore clarificatory: it situates the limits of SDL in the context of larger philosophical discussions on moral conflict and normative consistency.</p>

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On the Conceptual Limits of Standard Deontic Logic

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年5月23日

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  • Meha Mishra

摘要

Deontic logic aims to formulate moral concepts consisting of obligation, permission, and prohibition. Although the standard system of deontic logic (SDL) has long provided a fundamental framework for this kind of formalization, its application to non-ideal normative contexts continues to provide challenges. This paper provides a conceptual examination of SDL by analyzing its fundamental principles, semantic assumptions, and well-known paradoxes. The analysis emphasizes how moral conflicts and contrary-to-duty imperatives reveal structural tensions within conventional deontic frameworks, with a focus on classic paradoxes like the Chisholm and Ross paradoxes. The paper seeks to explain these challenges and demonstrate how they represent deeper conceptual constraints in modeling normative reasoning using idealized modal logics, rather than suggesting a new logical system. The main contribution of the paper is therefore clarificatory: it situates the limits of SDL in the context of larger philosophical discussions on moral conflict and normative consistency.