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<p><span>Mou</span> Zongsan’s 牟宗三 use of autonomy to reinterpret the history of Ruist ethics has been both profoundly influential and controversial in East Asian scholarship. In this paper, I examine why Mou felt autonomy was indispensable to morality, and how he transformed the concept of autonomy into something very different from how Kant understood it. Mou&#xa0;understood autonomy to mean the true self, identified as the fundamental mind or human nature in itself, acting in a manner free from sensible influence, though not necessarily determined by reason. After examining Mou’s conception of autonomy, I turn to how he argues that intellectual intuition can provide knowledge of autonomy. Four aspects of intellectual intuition are especially crucial: (1) pleasure in moral action; (2) reflective verification of the fundamental mind; (3) giving rise to moral action; (4) unity with all existents. I analyze each of these, and illustrate how Mou provides no certain method of confirming intellectual intuition. Intellectual intuition is supposed to provide knowledge of autonomy, but an agent can’t reliably tell if they’ve experienced it. That leaves autonomy still uncertain.</p>

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The Problem with Autonomy: Mou Zongsan and Free Will

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年6月27日

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  • David Elstein

摘要

Mou Zongsan’s 牟宗三 use of autonomy to reinterpret the history of Ruist ethics has been both profoundly influential and controversial in East Asian scholarship. In this paper, I examine why Mou felt autonomy was indispensable to morality, and how he transformed the concept of autonomy into something very different from how Kant understood it. Mou understood autonomy to mean the true self, identified as the fundamental mind or human nature in itself, acting in a manner free from sensible influence, though not necessarily determined by reason. After examining Mou’s conception of autonomy, I turn to how he argues that intellectual intuition can provide knowledge of autonomy. Four aspects of intellectual intuition are especially crucial: (1) pleasure in moral action; (2) reflective verification of the fundamental mind; (3) giving rise to moral action; (4) unity with all existents. I analyze each of these, and illustrate how Mou provides no certain method of confirming intellectual intuition. Intellectual intuition is supposed to provide knowledge of autonomy, but an agent can’t reliably tell if they’ve experienced it. That leaves autonomy still uncertain.