<p>This essay develops an account of resilience, which, combining insights from both the <i>Zhuangzi</i> 莊子 and empirical bereavement research, can shed light on a dilemma about resilience in contemporary philosophical debates. According to the dilemma, grief is a fitting response to the loss of someone that one cares about. If one continues to care for the deceased, resilience is unfitting and fails to reflect the magnitude of the loss. If one no longer cares for the deceased, grief is fitting, but still regrettable, since it indicates an alienation from previous concerns and a death of self. Against this dilemma, I argue that one can continue to care for the deceased without one’s resilience being unfitting. In particular, resilience as the Zhuangists conceive of it is achieved through the reconstitution of the self in response to the death of the beloved. When this happens, one is no longer much attached to the “living and breathing” relationship, which is lost. One can continue to care for the deceased, however, by carrying on and developing other forms of the relationship that remain intact. Thus, one’s care has been transformed so that it no longer depends on the actual existence of the beloved. One no longer experiences the death of the beloved as an important loss of self, and it is no longer fitting for one to grieve.</p>