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<p>The basic pension (Grundrente), passed by the Grand Coalition in July 2020 as a&#xa0;tax-financed supplement to low pensions, stands in contrast to the prevailing trend of declining pension security in Germany. In contrast, it represents an expansion of welfare state benefits. The reform was primarily driven by the Social Democratic Party (SPD), in whose party agenda pension policy has traditionally played a&#xa0;central role. However, the concept of the basic pension was not new in 2020: its core features had already been proposed in 2016 by SPD Labor Minister Andrea Nahles in the form of a&#xa0;“solidarity pension” (Solidarrente), which ultimately failed due to resistance from the CDU/CSU parties. The fact that the basic pension succeeded while the solidarity pension did not is remarkable—not only in light of the opposing dynamics in German pension policy in recent years, but also given the SPD’s long-term decline in voter support (with the exception of the 2021 federal election). This article examines the reasons behind the success of the basic pension and the failure of the solidarity pension using power resource theory, which links union and social democratic power to welfare state expansion. Through a&#xa0;context-contrastive research design, the article demonstrates that the basic pension was successfully implemented despite declining voter and membership support, primarily due to the strengthened institutional embeddedness of social democratic and union actors and their coordinated advocacy. The article thus contributes to the further development of power resource theory while also highlighting its limitations, particularly regarding the explanatory power of purely quantitative indicators.</p>

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Die Grundrente im Spiegel der Machtressourcentheorie

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  • 发表日期：

    2025年10月29日

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  • Veit Winkler,
  • Mechthild Roos

摘要

The basic pension (Grundrente), passed by the Grand Coalition in July 2020 as a tax-financed supplement to low pensions, stands in contrast to the prevailing trend of declining pension security in Germany. In contrast, it represents an expansion of welfare state benefits. The reform was primarily driven by the Social Democratic Party (SPD), in whose party agenda pension policy has traditionally played a central role. However, the concept of the basic pension was not new in 2020: its core features had already been proposed in 2016 by SPD Labor Minister Andrea Nahles in the form of a “solidarity pension” (Solidarrente), which ultimately failed due to resistance from the CDU/CSU parties. The fact that the basic pension succeeded while the solidarity pension did not is remarkable—not only in light of the opposing dynamics in German pension policy in recent years, but also given the SPD’s long-term decline in voter support (with the exception of the 2021 federal election). This article examines the reasons behind the success of the basic pension and the failure of the solidarity pension using power resource theory, which links union and social democratic power to welfare state expansion. Through a context-contrastive research design, the article demonstrates that the basic pension was successfully implemented despite declining voter and membership support, primarily due to the strengthened institutional embeddedness of social democratic and union actors and their coordinated advocacy. The article thus contributes to the further development of power resource theory while also highlighting its limitations, particularly regarding the explanatory power of purely quantitative indicators.