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<p>In this paper, we define multi-leader–follower Bayesian games by considering incomplete information among the followers. We then propose an equilibrium concept for such games and demonstrate the existence of equilibrium using the Fan-Glicksberg fixed point theorem. Furthermore, we show the structural stability and robustness of <InlineEquation ID="IEq1"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">\(\varepsilon \)</EquationSource> </InlineEquation>-equilibria when both the payoff functions and the players’ information are perturbed simultaneously.</p>

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The existence and robustness of solutions for multi-leader--follower Bayesian games

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年3月21日

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  • Huaxin Chen,
  • Wensheng Jia

摘要

In this paper, we define multi-leader–follower Bayesian games by considering incomplete information among the followers. We then propose an equilibrium concept for such games and demonstrate the existence of equilibrium using the Fan-Glicksberg fixed point theorem. Furthermore, we show the structural stability and robustness of \(\varepsilon \) -equilibria when both the payoff functions and the players’ information are perturbed simultaneously.