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<p>A great deal of common law jurisprudence—especially within criminal and constitutional law—treats an agent’s <i>control</i> as a primary (though not the sole) factor in determining the scope of the agent’s reasonable expectation of privacy. We raise a new philosophical challenge for this ‘control theorist’ approach. The challenge concerns a class of cases in which it seems that an agent both loses control over information and retains a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to that information. Faced with our challenge, some will abandon the control theorist’s tight link between privacy and control. We instead use the challenge to motivate a more refined account of the relationship between privacy and control on behalf of the control theorists. By refining an existing framework for adjudicating privacy’s scope, we show how the control theorist’s connection between privacy and control, far from being an impediment to robust privacy protections in a digital world, potentially provides an elegant tool for extending privacy’s scope.</p>

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‘Privacy at the Limits of Control’

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年9月29日

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  • Dominic Alford-Duguid,
  • Tashi Alford-Duguid

摘要

A great deal of common law jurisprudence—especially within criminal and constitutional law—treats an agent’s control as a primary (though not the sole) factor in determining the scope of the agent’s reasonable expectation of privacy. We raise a new philosophical challenge for this ‘control theorist’ approach. The challenge concerns a class of cases in which it seems that an agent both loses control over information and retains a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to that information. Faced with our challenge, some will abandon the control theorist’s tight link between privacy and control. We instead use the challenge to motivate a more refined account of the relationship between privacy and control on behalf of the control theorists. By refining an existing framework for adjudicating privacy’s scope, we show how the control theorist’s connection between privacy and control, far from being an impediment to robust privacy protections in a digital world, potentially provides an elegant tool for extending privacy’s scope.