<p>I present the following challenge to retributivists (including myself). I stipulate that retributivism is the claim that inflictions of deserved punishment produce intrinsic value. If this definition is accepted, it is curious that the academic writing of few if any retributivists express enthusiasm for punishing greater numbers of persons who commit serious crimes but are not apprehended. A great deal of intrinsic value could be added by increasing the clearance rates for serious offenses. In this paper I briefly explore five reasons that might explain and/or justify this reticence. Perhaps any value that is created by these punishments is too small to give rise to much concern. Or it is outweighed by competing disvalues. Or maybe efforts to increase existing rates of punishment would be too uncertain or difficult to implement. Or many of those we might seek to punish have viable excuses and are not blameworthy. Or perhaps the personal and political costs of broadening the net of penal liability are too great to incur among those committed to racial justice. Retributivists who are not eager to increase the number of deserving persons who are punished must choose from these five (or perhaps from other) options.</p>

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Taking Retributive Value Seriously

  • Douglas Husak

摘要

I present the following challenge to retributivists (including myself). I stipulate that retributivism is the claim that inflictions of deserved punishment produce intrinsic value. If this definition is accepted, it is curious that the academic writing of few if any retributivists express enthusiasm for punishing greater numbers of persons who commit serious crimes but are not apprehended. A great deal of intrinsic value could be added by increasing the clearance rates for serious offenses. In this paper I briefly explore five reasons that might explain and/or justify this reticence. Perhaps any value that is created by these punishments is too small to give rise to much concern. Or it is outweighed by competing disvalues. Or maybe efforts to increase existing rates of punishment would be too uncertain or difficult to implement. Or many of those we might seek to punish have viable excuses and are not blameworthy. Or perhaps the personal and political costs of broadening the net of penal liability are too great to incur among those committed to racial justice. Retributivists who are not eager to increase the number of deserving persons who are punished must choose from these five (or perhaps from other) options.