<p>Why do rising powers maintain a more limited earmarked funding portfolio compared to established (Western) powers? How do emerging powers, within their limited financial contributions, determine the allocation of resources across various UN entities? This paper proposes a theoretical framework to explain how these funding decisions reflect both its motivations and constraints faced by rising powers. We argue that rising powers confront a fundamental dilemma when engaging with established international institutions. While earmarked funding allows them to pursue foreign policy goals—such as enhancing influence and advancing geopolitical interests—it also entails opportunity costs. Funds allocated to one institution cannot be redirected to others, and the risks are significant: substantial financial contributions may ultimately prove ineffective or be discounted due to entrenched power structures within these organizations. Using an original dataset covering 69 UN entities from 2013 to 2022, we find that China employs a limited and selective approach to earmarked funding. China is more likely to direct funds toward entities with a higher number of Chinese nationals or where the executive heads have a high level of policy alignment, and less likely to fund entities that primarily benefit high-income countries. Our findings provide new insights into how rising powers, such as China, navigate multilateral institutions and seek influence, contributing to ongoing debates on great power competition, China’s rise and Chinese foreign policy. This study expands the emerging literature on how rising powers try to reshape established (Western-dominated) organizations, complementing research on earmarked funding, which has predominantly focused on Western donor behaviors.</p>