<p>The industrial internet holds immense potential for optimizing idle manufacturing services and driving a new wave of industrial transformation. To ensure its sustainable development requires a deep understanding of the collaborative dynamics among stakeholders and the factors shaping their strategic decisions. While previous research has examined stakeholder behavior within the industrial internet ecosystem, few studies have addressed the critical roles of government subsidies and perception biases—both of which are key in practice. This paper aims to bridge this gap and offer insights for the effective development of the industrial internet. To achieve this, we propose a tripartite evolutionary game model involving manufacturing service suppliers, requesters, and the industrial internet platform, grounded in Prospect Theory and Mental Accounting. We analyze the stability of equilibrium points and explore the effects of various factors, including the benefits of manufacturing service sharing, transaction fees, unmatching compensations, government subsidies, and reference points for benefits and costs, through simulation experiments. Our findings reveal that increasing the benefits of manufacturing service sharing and unmatching compensations, adjusting government subsidies, and reducing transaction fees can encourage greater participation from suppliers and requesters while motivating platforms to offer high-quality services. Furthermore, refining reference points by increasing the cost reference point and decreasing the valence reference point can help guide the system toward an optimal equilibrium. These insights provide practical recommendations for stakeholders, enabling them to design more effective strategies to foster the growth of the industrial internet ecosystem.</p>