Observer-Based Secure Synchronization Control of Complex Dynamic Networks Under Multi-Channel Deception Attacks
摘要
This paper aims to investigate the secure synchronization control for complex dynamic networks (CDNs) under multi-channel deceptive attacks. Deceptive attacks compromise system synchronization by injecting false information to manipulate node states. Unlike existing related research, cyber attacks may exist in both the sensor and controller channels. To address the impact of cyber attacks on the detection channel, the purpose of an observer is to estimate the state information. Meanwhile, to ensure the dynamic performance of CDNs, an observer-based secure synchronization control method under deception attacks is proposed. By applying the comparison theory and Lyapunov stability theorem, some conditions for secure synchronization are derived, and an estimate is made of the maximum permitted synchronization error. Lastly, two computational simulation examples are provided to confirm the precision and potency of the suggested conceptual framework.