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<p>In the present paper, we study post-quantum security properties of one block ciphers mode of operation called Disk Encryption with Counter (DEC). In Russian Federation, the DEC mode was standardized in the end of 2022. The purpose of the DEC mode is encryption of information stored on block-oriented storage devices. We define a notion of stateful tweakable encryption scheme and show that the simplified DEC mode instantiated by a block cipher satisfies this definition. Further, we define a provable security model from Q2 class called <Emphasis Type="Underline">qROP</Emphasis>-qfdeCPA. This model formalizes a notion of information confidentiality on a block-oriented storage device, when an adversary could perform superposition queries to encryption oracle. Then we show that the DEC mode is theoretically insecure in this setting. Further, we show that amount of adversary’s quantum resources (qubits and gates) required for successful distinguishing attack depends only on blocksize and disk sector size.</p>

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On post-quantum security properties of one block ciphers mode of operation for block-oriented storage devices protection

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年5月16日

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  • Georgii Firsov,
  • Alisa Koreneva

摘要

In the present paper, we study post-quantum security properties of one block ciphers mode of operation called Disk Encryption with Counter (DEC). In Russian Federation, the DEC mode was standardized in the end of 2022. The purpose of the DEC mode is encryption of information stored on block-oriented storage devices. We define a notion of stateful tweakable encryption scheme and show that the simplified DEC mode instantiated by a block cipher satisfies this definition. Further, we define a provable security model from Q2 class called qROP-qfdeCPA. This model formalizes a notion of information confidentiality on a block-oriented storage device, when an adversary could perform superposition queries to encryption oracle. Then we show that the DEC mode is theoretically insecure in this setting. Further, we show that amount of adversary’s quantum resources (qubits and gates) required for successful distinguishing attack depends only on blocksize and disk sector size.