Scholarlink

<p>This article analyzes the Zhuangzian moral sage—an ideal of effortless, spontaneous action aligned with the <i>Dao</i>—through Harry Frankfurt’s theory of free will, characterizing this figure as a “higher wanton.” The article then presents two analytic challenges to this ideal. First, it argues that the Zhuangzian sage’s exclusion of ambivalence undermines the well-functioning agency required in value-laden dilemmas. Second, it posits that the exclusion of rational reflection hampers the ability to navigate complex moral situations. Despite these critiques, the article offers possible Zhuangzian responses to both challenges. Ultimately, the goal is not to dismiss the Zhuangzian ideal, but to illuminate the tensions between Zhuangzian ideal and rationalist autonomy, fostering a dialogue between these distinct conceptual frameworks.</p>

错误：搜索内容不能为空，请输入英文关键词
错误：关键词超出字数限制，请精简
高级检索

Two Challenges to the Ideal of the Zhuangzian Moral Sage—Perspectives from Analytic Philosophy

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年7月3日

查看全文
  • Yuanfan Huang

摘要

This article analyzes the Zhuangzian moral sage—an ideal of effortless, spontaneous action aligned with the Dao—through Harry Frankfurt’s theory of free will, characterizing this figure as a “higher wanton.” The article then presents two analytic challenges to this ideal. First, it argues that the Zhuangzian sage’s exclusion of ambivalence undermines the well-functioning agency required in value-laden dilemmas. Second, it posits that the exclusion of rational reflection hampers the ability to navigate complex moral situations. Despite these critiques, the article offers possible Zhuangzian responses to both challenges. Ultimately, the goal is not to dismiss the Zhuangzian ideal, but to illuminate the tensions between Zhuangzian ideal and rationalist autonomy, fostering a dialogue between these distinct conceptual frameworks.