<p>Ken Daley has argued that cognitive enhancements aiming to improve evaluative judgment and self-control should be permissible on the same grounds as vaccinations: both reduce susceptibility to harm without causing comparable detriment. In this commentary, I argue that this analogy collapses upon closer inspection. I contend that Daley’s proposal faces a dilemma: it must be interpreted either as a form of moral enhancement or as an enhancement of prudential judgment. If the former, it entangles the vaccine analogy in the debate regarding compulsory bioenhancement, raising intractable problems regarding autonomy and the imposition of contested values that do not apply to somatic medicine. If the latter, I argue that such enhancements would structurally bias decision-making toward safety. This ‘hyper-prudence’ would not merely reduce harmful recklessness but could inadvertently eliminate the ‘poor judgment’ required for transformative human achievements and political solidarity—risks that are often only vindicated retrospectively. Finally, I argue that the transformative nature of such enhancements undermines the possibility of the very informed consent that the vaccination model presumes.</p>