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<p>This essay contributes to recent debate surrounding Frankfurt-style omission cases. While most philosophers writing on free will and moral responsibility now reject the thesis that responsibility for acting requires the ability to do otherwise (“The Principle of Alternative Possibilities,” or “PAP”), far more controversy remains regarding the thesis that responsibility for omitting to act requires the ability to do what was left undone (“The Principle of Possible Action,” or “PPA”). Frankfurt-style omission cases are widely considered less persuasive as counterexamples to PPA than Frankfurt-style action cases are as counterexamples to PAP. This has led many who reject PAP to nevertheless retain a commitment to PPA. In an insightful recent article, Joseph Metz claims to have discovered a principled difference between actions and omissions which explains why this surprising asymmetry holds. If Metz’s proposal is correct, opponents of PAP who accept PPA—himself included—stand to benefit significantly from endorsing it. Here, I argue that Metz’s proposed explanation why there are no successful omission FSCs fails to account for why omission FSCs do not undermine PPA regardless of whether any such cases successfully do so.</p>

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Causal Preemption and Moral Responsibility for Unavoidable Omissions: a Reply To Metz

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年11月1日

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  • Zachary Akin

摘要

This essay contributes to recent debate surrounding Frankfurt-style omission cases. While most philosophers writing on free will and moral responsibility now reject the thesis that responsibility for acting requires the ability to do otherwise (“The Principle of Alternative Possibilities,” or “PAP”), far more controversy remains regarding the thesis that responsibility for omitting to act requires the ability to do what was left undone (“The Principle of Possible Action,” or “PPA”). Frankfurt-style omission cases are widely considered less persuasive as counterexamples to PPA than Frankfurt-style action cases are as counterexamples to PAP. This has led many who reject PAP to nevertheless retain a commitment to PPA. In an insightful recent article, Joseph Metz claims to have discovered a principled difference between actions and omissions which explains why this surprising asymmetry holds. If Metz’s proposal is correct, opponents of PAP who accept PPA—himself included—stand to benefit significantly from endorsing it. Here, I argue that Metz’s proposed explanation why there are no successful omission FSCs fails to account for why omission FSCs do not undermine PPA regardless of whether any such cases successfully do so.