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<p>The guise of the good claims that it is, in part, because something appears good that one desires or wills it. This paper explores the contribution to the guise of the good in Paul Ricoeur’s early work <i>Freedom and Nature: The Voluntary and the Involuntary</i> (1950). I present an interpretation of Ricoeur’s guise of the good as part of his account of the reasons and motives involved in decision, arguing that he should be seen as proposing a distinctive pre-judgmental version of a “content view”, as opposed to the “attitude view”, and centred on the notion of “historialization” of a value. I argue that Ricoeur’s version offers new and promising solutions on two fronts of the contemporary debate on the guise of the good. First, it reduces the advantage gap claimed by attitude views over content views concerning the problem of intellectualism. Second, it offers a plausible alternative to a burdensome commitment to value universalism, to which guise of the good approaches are drawn.</p>

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Paul Ricoeur and the Guise of the Good

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年11月1日

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  • Francesco Orsi

摘要

The guise of the good claims that it is, in part, because something appears good that one desires or wills it. This paper explores the contribution to the guise of the good in Paul Ricoeur’s early work Freedom and Nature: The Voluntary and the Involuntary (1950). I present an interpretation of Ricoeur’s guise of the good as part of his account of the reasons and motives involved in decision, arguing that he should be seen as proposing a distinctive pre-judgmental version of a “content view”, as opposed to the “attitude view”, and centred on the notion of “historialization” of a value. I argue that Ricoeur’s version offers new and promising solutions on two fronts of the contemporary debate on the guise of the good. First, it reduces the advantage gap claimed by attitude views over content views concerning the problem of intellectualism. Second, it offers a plausible alternative to a burdensome commitment to value universalism, to which guise of the good approaches are drawn.