<p>Christopher Devlin Brown’s <i>The Hope and Horror of Physicalism: An Existential Treatise</i> (2024) is a novel contribution to analytical existentialism. The book is divided into three parts. In Part 1, Brown examines the existential consequences of two broad kinds of physicalism, distinguished by their characterization of the physical: via negativa physicalism and theory-based physicalism. He then argues that the existential consequences of via negativa physicalism are more existentially severe than those of theory-based physicalism. In Part 2, he examines how we ought to respond to the existential consequences of via negativa physicalism if it is true. In Part 3, he defends a version of via negativa physicalism, Russellian physicalism, arguing that it offers the most plausible response to the hard problem of consciousness. I first argue for the two-fold point that Brown mischaracterizes the theory-based approach to physicalism, and that when it is properly characterized we can see that it is just as existentially severe as via negativa physicalism. Then, I point out some gaps and omissions in Brown’s discussion of how we should respond to those existential consequences. Finally, I argue that the via negativa approach to characterizing the physical is inadequate, and that Brown’s attempt to make a case that Russellian physicalism offers the most plausible response to the hard problem is unsuccessful.</p>