<p>As commonly understood, Cian Dorr influentially argues that non-cognitivism must be rejected because it classifies instances of rational inference as wishful thinking. This is wrong. Dorr’s argument, as just described, with its appeal to the notion of wishful thinking, does not refute any version of non-cognitivism. But there is no need to read his paper as putting this argument forward. Rather, his paper can plausibly be understood as putting forward an argument against non-cognitivism which needs no appeal to the notion of wishful thinking. This argument relies on a principle implicit in the paper which gives a necessary condition of rational inference. I call this ‘the No-Difference Principle’. So understood this argument refutes versions of non-cognitivism which do not incorporate minimalism about belief. Enoch and Lenman argue that this is not so. Their arguments are mistaken because they are unable to explain the case of manifestly rational reasoning Dorr actually gives. But non-cognitivism combined with minimalism about belief is untouched by any argument in, or extractable from, Dorr’s paper.</p>