<p>Political theory undertakes the task of determining when the exercise of political power is justified. This paper presents a metatheoretical analysis of such justifications, starting from the hypothesis that they all share a common argumentation scheme. This ‘common warranting scheme’ rests on an instrumental view of the warranted use of power which leads to the ‘epistemic irrelevance of power’; the experience of living with power does not contribute to the discovery of normative reasons for politics. This is encouraged by another aspect of the common warranting scheme; theorists often operate with an insufficiently fine-grained notion of ‘power’. In order to supplement this widely shared approach to the justification of political power, I explore an account of political power that focuses on coercion and on the role of reasons in coercion.</p>

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Warrant for Coercion in Political Philosophy

  • Tim Heysse

摘要

Political theory undertakes the task of determining when the exercise of political power is justified. This paper presents a metatheoretical analysis of such justifications, starting from the hypothesis that they all share a common argumentation scheme. This ‘common warranting scheme’ rests on an instrumental view of the warranted use of power which leads to the ‘epistemic irrelevance of power’; the experience of living with power does not contribute to the discovery of normative reasons for politics. This is encouraged by another aspect of the common warranting scheme; theorists often operate with an insufficiently fine-grained notion of ‘power’. In order to supplement this widely shared approach to the justification of political power, I explore an account of political power that focuses on coercion and on the role of reasons in coercion.