Doubts About Russellian Physicalism
摘要
Russellian physicalism endeavours to combine the good things about Russellianmonism and the good things about physicalism. If it could be successfully made out, it would be a very appealing metaphysics of mind. Focusing on Christopher Devlin Brown's clever development of Russellian physicalism in The Hope and the Horror of Physicalism, I argue that Russellian physicalism faces a problem. Proponents need to be able to rule out 'panqualityism' - a species of panprotopsychism featuring irreducible qualitative properties - as a kind of Russellian physicalism, but it seems that they cannot do so, given the way Russellian physicalism is defined in terms of via negativa physicalism. This 'panqualityism challenge' casts serious doubt on the prospects of describing a coherent and stable Russellian physicalist position, doubtswhich may also affect the wider project to define physicalism by the via negativa.