There is an old strong objection to the Humean account of laws according to which, if the laws of nature are such as the Humean believes, it is an unexplained cosmic coincidence that the actual Humean mosaic is as extremely regular as it turns out to be. However, this objection has been neglected, mainly due to an implicit appeal to an unwarranted principle of indifference. In (Filomeno, 2019) I appealed to recent proofs of the epistemic rationality of the principle. Instead, in this paper I set that revival of the objection aside and take another route: the default route of suspending judgment about the objection’s soundness (which, as I argue, is the doxastic state of Humeans on this issue). Even in this case, I show that we—Humeans included—still cannot ignore the objection. More specifically, I show that under certain assumptions, met in this case, given an initial positive confidence in an hypothesis H, knowing of a crucial objection to H whose truth-value we ignore is not irrelevant information: one should update one’s confidence by also suspending belief in H. The conclusion is that what is epistemically rational for a Humean is, at best, to suspend judgment about the Humean account of laws.
