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<p>There has been a recent upsurge in interest in the odd structure of J. L. Austin’s <i>How to Do Things with Words </i>(1975). The first several chapters of this book are concerned with a distinction between performative utterances (through which the speaker <i>does </i>something) and constative utterances (through which the speaker <i>says </i>something about the world). Austin then finds this distinction unsatisfactory and so sets off on a path towards a more unified theory of speech acts. Marina Sbisà (2007; 2024) has explained this structure by interpreting Austin as offering a proof by contradiction for the claim that all speech is action. Wanderer and Townsend (2024) have disputed this interpretation, arguing that it leads to an uncharitable reading of Austin that fails to fully accord with the text. I defend Sbisà’s proof against Wanderer and Townsend’s criticisms, while adapting and reinterpreting certain aspects of it so as to improve it both as an interpretation of Austin and as an argument in its own right. I also supplement Sbisà’s account, by arguing that Austin chose to argue in a way that centres the performative/constative distinction because something like this distinction was popular amongst his contemporaries. Indeed, I claim that he explicitly alludes to certain strains of thought amongst these contemporaries that makes use of this distinction.</p>

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Performatives, Illocution, and Austin’s Proof

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年7月1日

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  • Zachary James Draysey

摘要

There has been a recent upsurge in interest in the odd structure of J. L. Austin’s How to Do Things with Words (1975). The first several chapters of this book are concerned with a distinction between performative utterances (through which the speaker does something) and constative utterances (through which the speaker says something about the world). Austin then finds this distinction unsatisfactory and so sets off on a path towards a more unified theory of speech acts. Marina Sbisà (2007; 2024) has explained this structure by interpreting Austin as offering a proof by contradiction for the claim that all speech is action. Wanderer and Townsend (2024) have disputed this interpretation, arguing that it leads to an uncharitable reading of Austin that fails to fully accord with the text. I defend Sbisà’s proof against Wanderer and Townsend’s criticisms, while adapting and reinterpreting certain aspects of it so as to improve it both as an interpretation of Austin and as an argument in its own right. I also supplement Sbisà’s account, by arguing that Austin chose to argue in a way that centres the performative/constative distinction because something like this distinction was popular amongst his contemporaries. Indeed, I claim that he explicitly alludes to certain strains of thought amongst these contemporaries that makes use of this distinction.