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<p>How far can we take Contingency Arguments? I intend the argument I present in this paper to be a minimal (or incomplete) version of a stage (II) contingency argument. I shall be demonstrating that one can argue from the existence of at least one merely <i>modally necessary</i> being to a being who is <i>ontologically necessary</i> (necessary in itself). Consequently, I shall be defending a dichotomy originally presented by Muslim philosopher Ibn Sina (Avicenna), who states that a modally necessary being is either ontologically necessary or its necessity is derived.</p>

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Ibn Sina’s Revenge: From Modal Necessity to Ontological Necessity

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年4月1日

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  • Hayyan Sheikh

摘要

How far can we take Contingency Arguments? I intend the argument I present in this paper to be a minimal (or incomplete) version of a stage (II) contingency argument. I shall be demonstrating that one can argue from the existence of at least one merely modally necessary being to a being who is ontologically necessary (necessary in itself). Consequently, I shall be defending a dichotomy originally presented by Muslim philosopher Ibn Sina (Avicenna), who states that a modally necessary being is either ontologically necessary or its necessity is derived.