<p>I argue, first, that logical fatalism entails an implausible commitment to causal nihilism. Not only is such a commitment grossly implausible, but it also leads to a <i>reductio</i> of the fatalist’s argument. Then I compare my diagnosis with Merricks’ refutation of fatalism based on an account of ontological dependence.</p>

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Logical Fatalism and Causal Nihilism

  • Y. Sandy Berkovski

摘要

I argue, first, that logical fatalism entails an implausible commitment to causal nihilism. Not only is such a commitment grossly implausible, but it also leads to a reductio of the fatalist’s argument. Then I compare my diagnosis with Merricks’ refutation of fatalism based on an account of ontological dependence.