<p>Russellian physicalism hopes to satisfy the motivating intuitions of physicalists and non-physicalists alike by offering an account of the fundamental nature of the physical world and suggesting that phenomenal consciousness is grounded in those fundamental physical properties. Mendelow has argued that Russellian physicalism as articulated by Pereboom turns out to make no progress toward answering anti-physicalist challenges on the grounds that the categorical properties posited by Russellian physicalists offer no explanatory help when it comes to the necessitation of phenomenal properties by lower-level physical properties. I argue that Mendelow’s argument fails on the grounds that (i) the intrinsicality of categorical properties offers an answer to the structure and dynamics argument, (ii) Russellian physicalism offers a satisfactory explanation for our epistemic situation, (iii) the choice of categorical properties that Mendelow employs in his argument—absolutely intrinsic sphericity and absolutely intrinsic solidity—are misleading examples, and (iv) the notions of absolutely intrinsic solidity/sphericity are either incoherent, or these properties are not “qualitatively identical” to comparatively intrinsic solidity/sphericity.</p>