<p>In <i>Free Will’s Value: Criminal Justice</i>,<i> Pride</i>,<i> and Love</i>, John Lemos defends the importance of libertarian free will for moral responsibility, criminal justice, and meaningful relationships. Lemos argues that libertarianism is a superior theory of free will compared to compatibilism and that it offers a foundation for criminal justice that better aligns with our moral intuitions than what the free will skeptics have offered so far. I critically examine Lemos’ arguments against compatibilism, in particular his rejection of compatibilism due to its apparent inability to respond adequately to the manipulation argument, and his own version of libertarianism, the ‘indeterministic weightings’ (IW) view. In considering Lemos’ treatment of the manipulation argument, I suggest a way that a compatibilist could object to Lemos’ dismissal of both hard- and soft-line replies. In considering the IW view, I focus on Lemos’ response to the luck problem and highlight the problematic role of indeterminacy in self-forming actions, which are supposed to be the ultimate foundation of moral responsibility.</p>