<p>Limitarianism is a new theory of distributive justice, according to which there should be a limit to how much wealth individuals are allowed to own. Such a limit is meant to promote two things: political equality and meeting unmet urgent human needs. Limitarianism rests on the premise that there is a certain point in terms of wealth beyond which more wealth does not contribute any more to one’s flourishing, where flourishing is understood as an objective, capability oriented, matter. This premise is meant to allow limitarians to argue that, while limiting the amount of wealth individuals are allowed to own to that point promotes these two valuable goals, nothing counts against doing so. In this paper I argue against this premise. I argue that the limitarian own objective, capability oriented, account of flourishing has to take into account the capability to achieve self-realisation, and that this capability does not lend itself to the limitarian reasoning of setting a maximum level it is reasonable for people to claim for a fully flourishing life. For sometimes this capability requires ownership of things that are worth indefinite (extreme) amounts of wealth. Therefore, the limitarian premise that, on its objective, capability oriented, account of flourishing, there is a certain point in terms of wealth beyond which more wealth does not contribute any more to one’s flourishing is false.</p>