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<p>In his superb book, Neil Van Leeuwen details a substantive and insightful account of religious attitudes. He takes their deviation from mundane (what he calls <i>factual</i>) beliefs to support a fracturing of religious attitudes from the category of belief, and indeed into their own category of <i>religious credence.</i> I suggest, instead, that the category of belief is wide one, not exhausted by those beliefs which are factual, and thus tolerant of significant differences in the dimensions which motivate Van Leeuwen’s view. Belief is cheap; it is an attitude which guides our actions, across contexts, all else equal. Religious attitudes meet this condition, and so they’re in the club. And, when their relationship to action looks shaky, we have grounds to claim that all else is not equal, and thus their doxastic membership remains secure.</p>

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Religious Attitudes are (not Factual) Beliefs

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年6月6日

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  • Ema Sullivan-Bissett

摘要

In his superb book, Neil Van Leeuwen details a substantive and insightful account of religious attitudes. He takes their deviation from mundane (what he calls factual) beliefs to support a fracturing of religious attitudes from the category of belief, and indeed into their own category of religious credence. I suggest, instead, that the category of belief is wide one, not exhausted by those beliefs which are factual, and thus tolerant of significant differences in the dimensions which motivate Van Leeuwen’s view. Belief is cheap; it is an attitude which guides our actions, across contexts, all else equal. Religious attitudes meet this condition, and so they’re in the club. And, when their relationship to action looks shaky, we have grounds to claim that all else is not equal, and thus their doxastic membership remains secure.