<p>Among contentious issues in Axel Honneth’s social theory is the status of primary recognition. Intended as a foundation for more substantial forms of recognition of love, respect, and esteem, primary recognition was criticised as capable of accounting for inclusionary attitudes only, and&#xa0;for its inability to account for human negativity. This paper is a critical analysis of the principal claim of Honneth’s epistemology of recognition which asserts an intrinsic relationship between perception and primary recognition. I argue that Honneth’s conception of primary recognition, based on mutually inconsistent claims concerning the relationships between perception and recognition, leads to a serious paradox. I claim that while primary recognition is conceptually and methodologically necessary to explain recognitive attitudes which are at the centre of his theory, it is also a precondition of exclusionary attitudes. I contend that the paradox in Honneth’s theory may be avoided with the help of the concept of the regime of perception. The idea of the perceptual regime is outlined through reference to the philosophical critique of perception and its functioning is illustrated by the example of antisemitism as a radically exclusivist ideology and practice.</p>