<p>Punishment plays a crucial role in driving norm change by incentivizing compliance with evolving shared normative expectations. Punitive measures typically encompass two components: a communicative effect, which delineates inappropriate conduct, and an institutionalized procedure that facilitates sanction enforcement. This study specifically investigates the latter dimension, examining how the mere existence of a punishment institution influences the formation of normative expectations. In other words, we examine whether behaviors such as extortion, when unpunishable and unmonitorable, are perceived as more socially appropriate. Using a neutrally framed harassment bribery game experiment, we manipulate the presence of a third-party punisher alongside with a Krupka–Weber norm-elicitation procedure to analyze shifts in participants’ normative perceptions. Our findings reveal no significant impact of the punishment institution on normative expectations. While a weak consensus emerges regarding the inappropriateness of extortion behavior, substantial disagreement persists concerning the merits of punishing extortionists. Policy implications of these results are discussed.</p>