<p>How can the central principal curb agency loss under information asymmetry, and how do local agents strategically respond? This article shows that dynamic monitoring, characterized by uncertainty and high pressure, forces agents to pivot from demonstrating competence to the highly visible signaling of their political stance, as immediate performance improvements are infeasible under sudden scrutiny. Leveraging the staggered rollout of inspections (2012–2022) and BERT analyses of 363,566 central media articles, we show that inspections drive a sharp increase in political alignment rhetoric, reorienting officials’ short-term communicative priorities toward visible loyalty signals. We find that this response is shaped by distinct incentive and risk constraints: (1) political imperatives and fiscal dependence drive aggressive signaling; (2) impending retirement compels officials to intensify their rhetoric for a safe exit; and (3) anti-corruption deterrence shapes officials’ behavioral choices: sustained anti-corruption pressure amplifies signaling, while internally vulnerable officials strategically “lay low” to evade scrutiny. We uncover the micro-mechanisms underlying the macro-impacts of dynamic monitoring, thereby advancing monitoring theory for unitary systems.</p>